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 ABSTRACT 
 
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a common protocol used in 
organizations for Directory Service. LDAP is popular because of its features such as 
representation of data objects in hierarchical form, being open source and relying on TCP/IP, 
which is necessary for Internet access. However, with LDAP being used in a large number of 
web applications, different types of LDAP injection attacks are becoming common. The idea 
behind LDAP injection attacks is to take advantage of an application not validating inputs 
before being used as part of LDAP queries. An attacker can provide inputs that may result in 
alteration of intended LDAP query structure. LDAP injection attacks can lead to various 
types of security breaches including (i) Login Bypass, (ii) Information Disclosure, (iii) 
Privilege Escalation, and (iv) Information Alteration. Despite many research efforts focused 
on traditional SQL Injection attacks, most of the proposed techniques cannot be suitably 
applied for mitigating LDAP injection attacks due to syntactic and semantic differences 
between LDAP and SQL queries. Many implemented web applications remain vulnerable to 
LDAP injection attacks. In particular, there has been little attention for testing web 
applications to detect the presence of LDAP query injection attacks. 
  
The aim of this thesis is two folds: First, study various types of LDAP injection attacks and 
vulnerabilities reported in the literature. The planned research is to critically examine and 
evaluate existing injection mitigation techniques using a set of open source applications 
reported to be vulnerable to LDAP query injection attacks. Second, propose an approach to 
detect LDAP injection attacks by generating test cases when developing secure web 
applications. In particular, the thesis focuses on specifying signatures for detecting LDAP 
injection attack types using Object Constraint Language (OCL) and evaluates the proposed 
approach using PHP web applications. We also measure the effectiveness of generated test 
cases using a metric named Mutation Score. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Motivation, Problem Statement and Contribution 
 
1.1 Background 
LDAP is a protocol used to access and maintain directory services. LDAP uses a client-server 
model for accessing directory information. The data required to form the Directory Information 
Tree (DIT) is stored in one or multiple LDAP servers [1]. The data models in directories enabled 
with LDAP are represented hierarchically to make the information easily accessible. Along with 
the hierarchical representation, LDAP also provides a standardized method of local and remote 
data access. Local access standards are provided by Relational Database Management Systems 
(RDBMS) systems such as SQL. However, remote access standards are usually proprietary. 
LDAP provides a method to move data to multiple locations without affecting any external 
access to the data. Such features and usability make LDAP unique and popular for its use in 
Directory services [2]. 
 
 
Figure 1: Directory tree structure of LDAP server 
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Figure 1 shows an example of LDAP directory tree structure. The tree is subdivided into 
different Organizational Units (ou) along with common names for each of them (cn). For 
example, the organizational unit of Human Resources has common name as HR. Different 
entries of each organizational unit are given under the common name such as the employees 
working in a particular department and any document relevant to the particular department. 
 
The LDAP is used in a large number of web applications, and therefore, different types of 
injection attacks are common. The idea behind LDAP injection [3] attack is to take advantage of 
an application’s vulnerability of not validating user inputs properly. A vulnerable application 
suffering from LDAP injection attacks can be exploited by providing carefully crafted input data 
containing parts of the LDAP query. After including the attacker’s inputs, the intended structure 
of LDAP query gets altered. When the altered query is executed, many unwanted activities can 
take place leading to security breaches (e.g., login bypass). A vulnerable application cannot 
differentiate a malicious query generated based on attacker’s supplied inputs and legitimate 
query generated based on benign inputs. LDAP injection attacks, such as Login Bypass, can lead 
to various types of security breaches. 
 
There are various possibilities of how LDAP injection attacks can be used to exploit a particular 
application. LDAP injection attacks allow attackers to disclose potentially sensitive information 
and manipulate certain data in the underlying database. As for example, in a popular event 
planner application, Events Planner - SmarterMail 7.x (7.2.3925) [4], LDAP injection 
vulnerability has been discovered where input type parameters can be provided to alter a 
disjunctive (OR) query to conjunctive (AND) query or vice versa. With this type of injection 
technique, an attacker can retrieve sensitive information. In many cases, administrators tend to 
configure LDAP server insecurely due to lack of knowledge. Thus, a simple injection technique 
could access user information or even change the password of the administrator. Many issues 
arise after LDAP being enabled because the applications were not tested with LDAP as the 
default protocol [5]. 
 
Different types of injection attacks such as SQL injections [6], LDAP injections [3] etc. have 
been prevalent among web applications over the last decade. In fact, query injection flaws 
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remain as one to the top ranked security vulnerabilities according to Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) report [7]. Among several common query injection attacks, much of 
the research efforts have been made to detect and prevent SQL injection attacks [8, 9, 10, 11, 
12]. In contrast, LDAP injection attacks have not received enough attention.  
 
1.2 Motivation 
LDAP injection attacks take place when an application does not validate user inputs properly. 
This vulnerability leads to exploitation of an application by providing carefully crafted data 
containing parts of the LDAP query. When the altered query is executed, it leads to different 
types of security breaches. Depending on the target application implementation, one could try to 
achieve any of the following types of attacks, including Login Bypass, Information Disclosure, 
Privilege Escalation, and Information Alteration. The attack types discussed in this Section have 
been gathered from the literature and technical reports [7, 13, 14, 15]. 
 
In this thesis, we have replicated these attacks with a prototype PHP web application employing 
backend LDAP server. Details of each of injection type are given below. 
 
Login Bypass 
First, we show an authorized access in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
Figure 2: A snapshot of a web application interface showing authorized access 
 
 
Figure 3: Resultant page after an authorized login 
Correct way 
of logging 
in. 
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Figure 2 shows the login interface for a web application. The Figure shows an authorized access 
by providing the username as pbulusu and password as 123456 which leads to the response page 
shown in Figure 3. The search filter becomes 
 
searchlogin = "(&(uid="pbulusu")(password="123456"))"; 
 
However, as shown in Figures 4 and 5, an attacker can login to the application bypassing the 
need of supplying valid username and password.  If the provided username and password values 
are not validated before applying them to generate a query intended to perform a search 
operation, the query gets altered. An attacker commonly applies valid special characters 
supported by the LDAP query engine such as &, |, (, and ). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A snapshot of unauthorized login 
 
                             
Figure 5: Resultant page after an unauthorized login 
 
Figure 4 shows an attempt of login bypass attack where an attacker provides the following string 
to bypass the login page [16]. The search filter becomes: 
 
$searchlogin = "(&(uid=*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*)(password="abcdef"))"; 
 
The attacker will 
be redirected to this 
page though the 
correct  username 
and password is not 
entered. 
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When the application runs this query in the backend LDAP server, it returns all available records 
leading to the login for the attacker based on the first available username. Figure 5 shows a 
snapshot of the resultant page after the injection attack where the attacker gets access to the 
application with the same privilege of first username pbulusu. Note that the inputs supplied at the 
user interface are not validated by the server side application, hence leading to this security 
breach. 
 
In a search query as stated above, if the username and password values are not checked, one 
could alter the dynamic query by inserting particular values. Special characters, such as *, &, |, 
(, and ), could be used to alter the final query’s purpose or intention. Though the correct user 
name and password may not be provided for a particular user, one can still get an access to the 
user account. 
    
Information Disclosure 
An attacker could alter a LDAP query thereby modifying it to another LDAP query with more 
information. This could be done depending on the internal LDAP query being used by the 
application. Figure 6 shows LDAP search operation code. 
 
1. $conn = ldap_connect("servername"); 
2. $search_string = $_POST[‘search’]; 
3. $users = ldap_search ($conn,"uid=$search_string"); 
Figure 6: Code for LDAP search operation 
 
Line 1 shows a user gets connected to the LDAP server. Line 2 shows the search string 
($search_string) that the user has entered in a form ($_POST[‘search’]). Line 3 shows the 
search function, ldap_search, used to search for the provided input. An attacker enters * as the 
input. Therefore, line 3 becomes $users = ldap_search($conn,"uid=*"); 
Figure 7 shows the attacker uses only the * symbol instead of a valid user name, and gets access 
to the information of all employees in the system (Figure 8). 
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Figure 7: A snapshot of information disclosure attack 
 
                                                    
Figure 8: The resultant page after information disclosure attack 
 
Privilege Escalation 
An attacker could alter a LDAP query modifying it to another query with the intention of gaining 
more privilege defined by the security level of the objects. This could be done depending on the 
internal LDAP query being used by the application. Figures 9 and 10 illustrate privilege 
escalation attack. 
 
 
Figure 9: A snapshot of privilege escalation attack 
Only the "*" 
symbol is being 
used instead of a 
valid user name 
in this case. 
The attacker can 
get access to the 
entire Directory 
since the code is 
vulnerable. 
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Figure 10: The resultant page after privilege escalation attack 
 
In Figure 1, user klegg and mlevy are listed under ou - HumanResources. Each of them has 
different access privileges to various resources. In Figure 9, the user mlevy (attacker) is 
providing the user name as klegg(ou=* and the password as *. As a result, user mlevy will be 
able to gain access privileges of user klegg (victim). Now, mlevy has access to klegg’s resources 
shown in Figure 10. 
 
Information Alteration 
LDAP can be used for adding, modifying and deleting information along with search operations. 
Different applications that manage directory data in organizations are not necessarily connected 
to the directory server. Instead, Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are used to interact 
via LDAP with the information stored in the directory. If the user provides inputs to an 
application through a form, an attacker may modify this information to generate an unexpected 
result such as modification or deletion of information [14]. Figure 11 shows code for information 
alteration. 
 
1. $attr[“cn”] = “klegg”; 
2. $dn = “uid=klegg,ou=*”; 
3. $result = ldap_modify($ldapconn,$dn, $attr); 
Figure 11: Code for information alteration 
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In Figure 1, klegg belongs under organizational unit (ou) HumanResources. However, at Line 2, 
and distinguished name ($dn) is formed having ou=*. The alteration of ou is invoked by the 
method ldap_modify() at Line 3. As a result, klegg now belongs to the other ou (Sales).  
 
Figures 12 and 13 illustrate an example of information alteration type of LDAP injection attack. 
In Figure 12, the user sprice of ou Sales Representative who has security level as 'low' accesses 
and replaces the Contract Document #2 which belongs to ou Senior Management with the 
security level 'high'. In applications which are vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks, an attacker 
can replace information successfully as shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 12: A snapshot of information alteration attack 
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Figure 13: Resultant changes after information alteration attack 
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
Protection of LDAP-enabled web applications involves significant effort for the administrators 
and developers. Though prevention approaches of LDAP injection attacks are available (e.g., 
administrator and developer techniques), they cannot eliminate LDAP injection attacks 
completely. This work is an effort to research and propose a new approach to address LDAP 
injection attack types. 
 
During our literature search, we identified a list of common limitations among past research 
efforts. These limitations are summarized as follows:  
 
 Lack of exhaustive LDAP injection attack type detection coverage. In particular, most 
efforts are effective to detect only login bypass attacks. However, they are not suitable for 
mitigating privilege escalation attacks that may occur through legitimate login of a user in 
vulnerable applications. 
 Little support to enable developers to securely implement web applications resistant to 
LDAP injection attacks. In particular, there is no effort of formally specifying attack 
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signatures which should be tested with suitable test inputs for the presence of LDAP 
injection vulnerabilities. 
 
Given the obtained literature search results, we define the problem statement for this thesis as 
follows: 
This research work addresses common limitations found in past research efforts by performing 
an in-depth study of LDAP injection attack types, provides an approach to detect the different 
types of LDAP injection attacks, and evaluates the proposed approach using PHP web 
applications known to be vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research methodology comprised of an intensive literature review of over 40 articles 
consisting of information on LDAP injection attacks and mitigation techniques. The research 
methodology involves the following activities: 
1) Conduct literature search on existing LDAP injection attack types and their prevention 
techniques. 
2) Study and analyze collected information to understand how LDAP injection attacks are 
performed by the attackers and how they are executed at the server side. 
3) Develop a prototype web application to replicate selected LDAP injection attacks to 
specify the signatures of LDAP injection attacks. 
4) Develop a technique to detect LDAP injection attacks based on the identified attack 
signatures.  
5) Evaluate the proposed detection technique against PHP web applications. 
 
1.5 Contribution 
The objectives of this thesis are to conduct an in-depth survey of various types of LDAP 
injection attacks; study LDAP injection attacks for various scenarios and understand their 
impact; develop a taxonomy of LDAP code injection attacks; select a set of tools to be studied to 
compare the suitability of LDAP injection detection; and develop a new technique to overcome 
existing limitations and detect LDAP injection attacks. 
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The work addresses the stated problem statement by performing the following tasks:  
 
1) Conduct Literature Search and Develop Web Application 
i. Conduct literature survey on existing techniques and methodologies used to prevent 
LDAP injection attacks and critically examine the code of existing injection mitigation 
techniques. 
ii. Compile the literature research results and document the findings for conference 
submission. 
iii. Develop a web application to replicate selected LDAP injection attacks and to check the 
effect it has on the application. 
 
2) Develop Detection Technique  
i. Apply Object Constraint Language-based (OCL) to specify signatures for LDAP 
injection attack types. With OCL, we capture the needed pre-conditions, post-conditions, 
and invariants that might get affected due to LDAP query injection attacks. 
ii. Develop an algorithm to perform fault-injection on OCL constraints (pre-conditions and 
post-conditions). 
 
3) Perform Evaluation and Dissemination 
i. Apply and evaluate the proposed technique with a developed PHP web application and 
one open source PHP web application reported to have LDAP injection vulnerability.  
ii. Disseminate the work results through conference publications. 
 
In the next Chapter, we discuss the literature search findings about the various mitigation 
techniques for LDAP injection attacks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Overview 
Many research works have been done in the past to prevent LDAP injection attacks [17, 18, 19, 
20, 21]. This Chapter presents a literature review of related work on LDAP injection attacks and 
highlights common Mitigation Techniques (MTs). This chapter also contrasts SQL Injection and 
LDAP Query Injection attacks.  
 
2.2 Mitigation Techniques for LDAP Injection Attacks 
Upon literature review of existing mitigation techniques for LDAP query injection attacks, we 
classify these techniques into six categories (MT1-MT6) described below. 
 
MT1: Administrator techniques 
Password Policy Schema – LDAP has an overlay called Password Policy (ppolicy) to prevent 
LDAP injection attacks. The default policy of ppolicy is that the user account gets locked for 24 
hours after 10 failed access attempts so as to prevent unauthorized access [13]. 
 
LDAP Configuration – This is another approach in which access control is implemented on the 
data in the LDAP directory, especially during configuration of permissions on user objects, and 
also when the directory is used for single sign-on solution. The access level permitted to the 
users can be limited wherein they are not allowed to make any modifications thereby preventing 
LDAP injection attacks [13 and 15]. 
 
IP Firewall – Access can be restricted by using the IP firewall capability of the server system. 
This is either based on the clients' IP address and network interface, or only the network interface 
used to communicate with the client. The configuration of IP firewall are dependent on the type 
of IP firewall used [22]. 
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MT2: Developer techniques 
Incoming data Validation and Dynamic checks – This is another technique of prevention. All 
client supplied data should be thoroughly checked for any kind of malicious input. The best way 
of achieving this is to default-deny everything else other than letters and numbers. However, if 
symbols need to be used, they should be converted to HTML substitutes before usage [13]. 
 
Another prevention technique is to escape special characters. Most of the LDAP injection attacks 
are performed using special characters either in the 'Distinguished Name' field or in the 'Search' 
filter. Escaping these characters help prevent LDAP injection attacks. 
 
Characters such as &,!,|,=,<,>,,,+,-,",', and ;, should be escaped using \ before being used 
in a query; while characters such as (,),\,*,/ and Null used in the Search filter can be escaped 
using {\ASCII}, which are given as {\28},{\29},{\5c},{\2a},{\2f} and {\0} respectively. It is a 
good practice to include '\\' at the beginning of escaped character listings to prevent recursive 
replacements [23]. 
 
MT3: Program Transformation technique 
The security of a system perimeter can be improved by using security oriented program 
transformations by introducing the components of authentication, authorization and input 
validation. These three components play a critical role in the security of any system as they form 
the basis for prevention of exploitation when applied effectively. When the code is developed for 
a particular system, the general approach is to design security from the base level and fix new 
vulnerabilities when a security threat is faced. Since it is not feasible to redesign the entire 
software whenever a security threat emerges, the vulnerability is fixed only at a certain set of 
points. In either way, the vulnerability is not fixed globally. Though the approach of security-
oriented program transformations is compared to 'refactoring', it does not preserve the original 
behavior of the system; instead, it preserves the expected behavior and responds in accordance 
with the attacks.  
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The developer plays a key role in specifying the input validation policies as well as parameters 
for the program transformation mechanism. Once the input validation policy and the parameters 
are known, the implementation of program transformations becomes faster and more reliable. 
 
The input validation task can either be achieved by adding a centralized perimeter filter thereby 
eliminating duplication of code or multiple validation policies can be applied to the input 
variable by using 'Decorated Filter'. Figure 14 shows how a SQL injection attack could be 
eliminated by using 'Decorated Filter'. However, the policies to be applied for the input 
validation of SQL and LDAP injection are different; hence the developer can either use a library 
of filters or customize it by using parameters. 
 
 
Figure 14: Elimination of SQL injection attack using 'Decorated Filter' Transformation 
 
In this technique of adding security on demand, when an unsafe input occurs, it is transformed to 
a safe input thereby preventing the attack. By using automated tools in this type of rectification 
policy, programmers can focus on policies instead of writing and implementing checks, which is 
a time consuming task. Program transformations are currently used to eliminate SQL injection 
attacks, Log injection attacks, XSS injection attacks, and Direct Static Code injection attacks by 
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implementing policies and removing AND and OR statements. However, they can be similarly 
implemented to avoid LDAP injection attacks as well [17 and 18]. 
 
MT4: Application Security IDE technique 
 Application Security IDE (Integrated Development Environment) is an approach that works 
similar to spelling and grammar checks in word processor, indicating potential errors while 
developing a program thereby allowing developers to fix it and reducing the chances for a 
possible future security threat. Moreover, these warnings can also be used at a later stage to 
reduce time in software security audits. This particular approach has not been implemented to 
prevent LDAP injection attacks primarily. However, the mechanism of 'Interactive Code 
Refactoring' is used for 'Input Validation', which is one of the key factors in preventing LDAP 
injection attacks [19]. 
 
MT5: Remote Code Execution detection technique 
Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks are considered as one of the most prominent security 
threats for web applications in the recent times. The attacks caused with the help of RCE are to 
such an extent that it is the most widespread PHP Security issue since the mid of 2004 (Open 
Web Application Security Project - OWASP). These kind of attacks are similar to Cross Site 
Scripting but in a more sophisticated way as they require multiple rounds of communication 
between client and server. This approach has been applied to phpMyAdmin and phpLDAPadmin 
applications.  
 
Figure 15 shows that a particular type of RCE vulnerability exists in phpLDAPadmin because 
malicious code can be provided and executed. The malicious code executes for access control 
and allows the attacker to perform privilege escalation. Using RCE detection prevents privilege 
escalation injection attacks [21]. 
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Figure 15: RCE in phpLDAPadmin v1.2.1.1 (Simplified) 
 
MT6: Static Analysis technique 
In this approach, a formal vulnerability signature can be used to detect a possible vulnerability. 
Object Constraint Language (OCL) is used to capture vulnerability signatures. Depending on 
whether the source of the vulnerability is related to input validation, output validation, 
processing or hosting, they are categorized so as to perform static/dynamic analysis. Using a 
formal vulnerability analysis definition can be beneficial to perform 'threat analysis' and 
'vulnerability analysis' during the development stage as well as 'attack analysis' after deployment 
of the project. This can help find possible vulnerabilities and appropriate action can be taken. 
OCL based vulnerability signatures can be applied for prevention of SQLI, XSS, Improper 
Authentication, and Improper Authorization. Though this approach has not been directly used for 
prevention of LDAP injection attacks, it can be modified accordingly [20].  
 
Table 1 shows the source and scope of implementation for each mitigation technique discussed 
above. Other types of mitigation techniques include those used to prevent SQL injection attacks. 
Among several common types of query injection attacks, much of the research efforts have 
focused on preventing SQL injection attacks [22, 24, 10, 11, 12]. In contrast, LDAP injection 
attacks have not received enough attention. 
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Table 1: Mitigation Techniques: Source and Scope of Implementation 
 Source Mitigation Technique Scope of Implementation 
MT1 
Administrator techniques 
[15,22,25] 
Password Policy Schema; Frequent 
changing of Password; LDAP 
Configuration; IP Firewall 
LDAP injection 
MT2 
Developer techniques 
[13,14] 
Data validation and dynamic 
checks; Outgoing data validation 
LDAP injection 
MT3 
Prevention of Injection 
Attacks by Rectification 
policies [17] Program Transformations 
SQL injection; LDAP 
injection; Log injection; XSS 
injection; Direct Static Code 
injection Program transformation 
techniques [18] 
MT4 
Application Security IDE 
technique [19] 
Interactive Code Refactoring; 
Interactive Code Annotation; (still 
in implementation stage) 
Input validation; Broken 
Access control; Cross-site 
Request Forgery 
MT5 
Remote Code Execution 
detection technique [20] 
Static Analysis Static Analysis 
MT6 
Static Analysis based 
technique [21] 
OCL-based vulnerability signature 
approach 
SQL injection; XSS injection; 
Improper Authorization; 
Improper Authentication 
 
Table 2 provides a mapping of mitigation techniques to attack types. The symbols and  
indicate whether a mitigation technique is applicable or not to prevent the corresponding attack 
types. The  symbol indicates that a mitigation technique has been applied to prevent other types 
of attacks (SQL injection), but not LDAP Injection. 
 
Table 2: Mapping mitigation techniques to attack type 
 
Login 
Bypass 
Information 
Disclosure 
Privilege 
Escalation 
Information 
Alteration 
MT1     
MT2     
MT3     
MT4     
MT5     
MT6     
 
 
29 
 
As shown in Table 2, various mitigation techniques that have been developed and implemented 
focusing on injection attacks in general but not particularly on LDAP injection attacks types. 
Moreover, these techniques do not necessarily provide a complete solution to such injection 
attacks. They are implemented to focus on a particular scenario, or provide a solution with prior 
restrictions. 
 
2.3 Comparison of SQL and LDAP Queries  
Our work is motivated by the syntactical differences and usage between SQL and LDAP queries. 
Techniques such as proxy-based approach of preventing SQL injection attacks [9], static analysis 
[12], library class PreparedStatements in Java [26] can be used to prevent  SQL query injection 
attacks but cannot be directly applied to prevent LDAP query injection attacks. 
 
Given the syntactic differences between SQL and LDAP, further discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.5), the injection attack inputs and the subsequent consequences are also different. For example, 
a traditional tautology SQL injection attack may lead to deleting an entire table; whereas a 
tautology LDAP injection attack may lead to leaking privileged information from a node at a 
specific level in the directory tree [27, 28].  
 
Table 3 illustrates the difference between LDAP and SQL query. A benign input is given in rows 
1 and 2 and rows 3 and 4 consist of an attack input (username and password). The second and 
third column shows the search query for LDAP (ldapQuery) and SQL (sqlQuery), 
respectively. The second row shows the LDAP and SQL queries for the supplied benign input 
(username and password). In particular, the LDAP query has two expressions 
(uid="pbulusu", password="123456"), the results of these expressions are combined 
logically with AND (&). The SQL query result is affected by the WHERE condition, where all 
columns from table users for the rows having username and password columns as pbulusu and 
123456, respectively, are returned. 
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Table 3: LDAP vs. SQL query 
 LDAP Search Query SQL Search Query 
Benign 
Input 
Username: pbulusu 
Password: 123456 
Username: pbulusu 
Password: 123456 
Query with 
benign input 
ldapQuery="(&(uid="pbulusu")(
password="123456"))"; 
sqlQuery = 'SELECT * FROM users 
WHERE username="pbulusu" AND 
password= "123456"'; 
Attack input 
Username: *)(uid=*))(|(uid=* 
Password: "" 
Username: "" 
Password: "" OR ("1"="1) 
Query with 
attack input 
ldapQuery="(&(uid=*)(uid=*))(
|(uid=*)(userPassword=""))"; 
sqlQuery = 'SELECT * FROM users 
WHERE username="" AND 
password="" OR ("1"="1")'; 
 
The third and fourth rows of Table 3 show attack inputs and corresponding queries for LDAP 
and SQL, respectively. An attacker performs an LDAP query injection attack by providing the 
username as '*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*' and the password as blank. The resultant LDAP query 
becomes ldapQuery="(&(uid=*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*)(userPassword=))", which would 
return all user IDs from the directory tree. In contrast, an attacker performs a SQL query 
injection attack by providing the username as "" and the password as "" OR ("1"="1). The 
resultant SQL query becomes sqlQuery = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE username="" AND 
password="" OR ("1"="1")'. The WHERE condition will be evaluated as true, which would 
return all selected rows from table users. Hence, an attacker can gain unauthorized access. 
 
Different types of injection attacks such as SQL injections [6] and LDAP injections [3] have 
been prevalent among web applications over the last decade. In fact, query injection flaws 
remain as one of the top ranked web security vulnerabilities according to Open Web Application 
Security Project (OWASP) report [7]. 
 
In the next Chapter, we present technology overview and discuss some more details of LDAP.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Technology Overview 
 
3.1 Overview 
This Chapter presents a technology overview of the LDAP protocol. Some more details of LDAP 
such as formation of LDAP query, different nodes in LDAP such as Common Name (cn), 
Distinguished Name (dn) etc. are introduced in this Chapter. It also includes an introduction to 
SQL and the basic differences between LDAP and SQL. 
 
3.2 Technology Overview 
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a commonly used protocol in 
organizations for accessing information from directories. LDAP was developed by The Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in order to find a simpler version of the existing Directory 
Access Protocol X.500. The term 'Lightweight' in LDAP comes from the fact that there is a 
reduction in the number of protocol overheads in comparison with the X.500 [2]. LDAP gains its 
popularity because of features such as representation of data objects in hierarchical form, being 
open source and relying on TCP/IP, which is necessary for Internet access. LDAP uses the 
TCP/IP for its transport and network layers instead of Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI Model) stack which was used in the X.500. Some duplicate functions from X.500 standard 
were eliminated in LDAP. It is significantly simpler and can be customized according to the 
needs of a particular organization [29]. 
 
LDAP is particularly used for 'Write-once-Read-many' kind of applications. Thus, LDAP is 
suitable for maintaining the contact information of all the employees in any organization which 
would remain the same for a large period of time. However, LDAP is not suitable for 
applications that require frequent content update such as online transaction processing and e-
commerce. LDAP is highly suitable when the data being stored requires features such as cross-
platform availability of data, access to data from a large number of computers or applications, 
few changes of data, and storage of data in a single record [30]. 
32 
 
3.3 Formation of LDAP Query 
The formation of an LDAP query consists of defining the LDAP Server details, connecting to the 
LDAP server and binding to the LDAP server. Depending on the final requirement, the query 
will consist of several operations such as search, update and delete. Figure 16 shows example 
code that uses PHP to connect and bind to the LDAP server.  
 
// configuration 
1. $ldapserver = '192.168.1.124';   -- LDAP Server 
2. $ldaptree   = "dc=ubuntuldap2";  -- Defining DC (Domain Component) 
 
// connection to ldap server  
3. $ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP 
server."); 
4. ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3); 
 
// verifying connection to ldap server 
5. if($ldapconn){ 
    
// binding to ldap server 
6.   $ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,".$ldaptree, "admin") or die 
("Please enter valid login credentials!"); 
 
// verify binding 
7.   if ($ldapbind) { 
8.    Perform multiple tasks here...(Such as Search/Update/Delete) 
11.  } 
12.} 
Figure 16: Code for formation of LDAP query 
 
In Figure 16, line 1 defines the IP address of the LDAP server. The LDAP tree with base domain 
component (dc=ubuntuldap2) is defined in line 2. Line 3 establishes a connection to the LDAP 
server through ldap_connect(…) method call. If the connection is unsuccessful, the script throws 
an error stating 'Could not connect to LDAP server'. Line 4 sets the protocol version. 
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Once the LDAP connection is verified in line 5, the next step is to bind to the LDAP server as 
shown in line 6. Once the LDAP Binding is verified in line 7, the user can perform multiple tasks 
based on the requirement.  
 
3.4 Different Nodes in LDAP 
Common nodes in an LDAP directory are defined as o (organization), dc (domain component), 
ou (organizational unit), dn (distinguished name) and cn (common name) according to the X.500 
Directory specification.  
 
Data in LDAP is represented in a hierarchical tree structure called Data Information Tree (DIT). 
The tree structure of LDAP directory is similar to the top-down representation of UNIX file 
directories or Domain Name Server (DNS) trees. The top level in the LDAP tree structure is 
referred to as the base dn and breaks down into individual objects, each of which is called an 
entry. A simple representation of DIT is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17: Diagrammatic representation of LDAP directory tree structure 
 
Figure 17 shows the directory structure for a small company. The top-level node 
in TinyCompany has an Organization (O) attribute. TinyCompany comprises of the Engineering, 
Accounting, and Marketing departments which are represented with Organizational Unit (OU) 
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entry (e.g., OU=Engineering). Accounting OU has two organizational units which are Accounts 
Payable and Accounts Receivable. For example, the common name (CN) Kathy Lee is under the 
OUs Accounts Payable and Accounting. It can thus be seen that, an entry can be composed of 
one or more OUs. The Marketing OU has one printer resource (CN=Printer3) [31]. 
 
3.5 SQL and LDAP 
SQL is a database query language whereas LDAP is a protocol used for accessing directory 
service. There are significant differences between SQL and LDAP. First, LDAP is a protocol for 
accessing directory data over the network, where directory information is faster and easier to 
read. However, update and delete operations are expensive. On the other hand, SQL is a query 
language that supports transactional operations on relational databases requiring frequent read, 
write, update, and delete operations.  
 
The data representation and organization between LDAP and SQL also remain largely dissimilar. 
For example, LDAP stores directory data in a tree structure having a set of nodes and edges; 
whereas SQL stores data in tables of a relational database. The LDAP tree may reside among 
multiple machines in a network, whereas traditional SQL database stores tabular data in one 
local machine. 
 
At the syntax level, though there are some similarities between SQL and LDAP (e.g., =, >, <). 
Operation wise, both support insertion, deletion, and viewing of data. However, there are 
dissimilarities in syntax. For example, SQL “AND” means the logical AND operation, whereas 
LDAP represents it as “&”. Further, SQL supports a rich set of aggregate (e.g., count, sum) and 
join (e.g., inner join, outer join) operations for multiple queries. In contrast, LDAP has no such 
support. 
 
In the next Chapter, we introduce fault-injection based testing, some related work on fault-
injection based testing, and our proposed approach.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
OCL Fault-Injection Based Testing Approach 
 
4.1 Overview 
This Chapter introduces the approach fault-injection based testing and covers some relevant 
work on fault-injection based testing in Section 4.2. Next, we introduce Object Constraint 
Language (OCL) and our proposed approach of OCL fault-injection based testing in Sections 4.3 
and 4.4, respectively. 
 
4.2 Related Work on Fault-Injection Based Testing  
Fault-based testing technique is intended to generate or assess test cases by anticipating errors in 
a system under test and deliberately inject faults in the system. This approach can demonstrate 
only the presence of specific faults (injected), but not the absence of faults during testing. The 
approach can identify effective test cases that can reveal specific faults we injected in the system 
[32].  
 
Some relevant works on fault-injection based testing [33-38] are shown in Table 4. These works 
use this technique to test robustness of web application security scanner [33], effectiveness of 
intrusion detection systems intended to detect network protocol level attacks [34], robustness of 
router protocol implementation to tolerate malformed protocol data units against failure or 
crashes [35], effectiveness of input validation routines in web applications implemented in PHP 
[36], capability of handling malformed input PDF files by Java applications [37], robustness of 
embedded applications against skipping login mechanism bypassing [38], utility applications 
written in C/C++ [39], and evaluation of performance and security of web services [40].  
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Table 4: Comparison of related work 
Tool / Work 
(Test Level) 
Vulnerability  
covered 
Source of test 
cases 
Test case generation method 
Target 
applications 
Fonseca et al. 
[33] 
SQLI and XSS N/A N/A Web scanners 
Vigna et al. 
[34] 
Buffer Overflow 
(BOF), Format 
String Bug (FSB) 
Attack 
templates 
Inject fault in application and network 
layer 
Intrusion detection 
systems 
Tal et al. [35] BOF 
Protocol 
syntax 
Inject faults 
Network router 
algorithm 
implementation 
(daemons) 
Kiezun et al. 
[36] 
SQLI and XSS Source code 
Solve path constraints in applications and 
replace non malicious test cases with 
attack test case 
Web applications 
in PHP 
Ghosh et al. 
[37] 
Testing of 
program crash, 
abnormal 
behavior through 
exceptions such as 
DocumentExcepti
on, IOException 
etc. 
Java byte code 
Instrumenting class file using BCEL tool, 
tester needs to select a program line to 
replace with injected faulty line of code at 
Java opcode level 
Java, tested on PDF 
generator 
application written 
in Java 
Fouque et al. 
[38] 
Bypassing 
password 
checking through 
buffer overflow 
exploit 
N/A 
Faults injected at the assembly code level 
by changing the return address of a 
function conducting access control check, 
with the next instruction as skipping 
access control 
Applications 
running on 
embedded 
hardware, used for 
access control 
application such as 
password checking 
Voas [39] Buffer overflow Source code 
Replacing, adding or deleting source code, 
replacing implemented function call with 
perturbed function call intended to lead 
fault by altering parameter or return values 
Utility applications 
such as FTP server 
(wu-ftpd) 
Oliveira et 
al.[40] 
Assess 
performance 
anomaly of web 
service 
frameworks 
Web service 
Performance of web services stacks are 
evaluated using a benchmark called 
WSTest with different SOAP object sizes 
and security of web services is evaluated 
using security testing tool called 
WSFAggressor 
Web Service 
frameworks 
Salas et al. 
[41] 
SQLI 
Incomplete or 
under-
specified 
model 
Obtain constraints from design 
documents, express constraints in Object 
Constraint Language (OCL), finally 
solving it with a constraint solver 
Web applications 
design 
Grela et al. 
[42] 
Anomaly of 
Business 
Processes 
Fault-injection 
in BPEL 
processes 
Software Fault Injector for BPEL 
processes (SFIBP) 
Business Process 
Execution 
Language (BPEL) 
processes 
Aichernig et 
al.[32] 
N/A 
Model-based 
specifications 
Mutation of OCL specifications 
Triangle type 
determination 
program 
Our approach LDAP Injection 
Source code 
and OCL 
Derive pre-conditions and post-conditions 
from flow graph, and mutate pre-
conditions and post-conditions 
Web applications 
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A few approaches rely on application design level information to generate test cases. Salas et al.  
[41] generate OCL constraints from UML class diagrams and solve them to generate test cases; 
while Grela et al. [42] propose fault-injection in business processes expressed in Business 
Process Execution Language.  
 
Our work is closely related to the test case generation method presented by Aichernig et al. [32]. 
In their work, the authors have presented a method of test case generation for pre-condition and 
post-condition specifications. They have generated Object Constraint Language (OCL) 
specifications for a triangle type determination program, whereas we have generated OCL 
specifications for PHP web applications relevant to LDAP query injection attacks. Our approach 
also consists of generating control flow charts to identify needed pre and post-conditions. 
 
In contrast to earlier work, our proposed technique obtains control flow from source code, 
derives expected constraints and then applies faults in pre-conditions or post-conditions to 
generate test cases to reveal LDAP injection vulnerabilities. We express pre-conditions and post-
conditions using OCL notation. 
 
4.3 Object Constraint Language (OCL)  
OCL is a language that complements Unified Modeling Language (UML) notations. OCL is used 
to describe and enhance rules that are applicable to UML. Detailed aspects of a system design 
can be precisely described using OCL which is not possible with UML alone. Thus, OCL is 
widely used in model-driven engineering (MDE) techniques as a default language to express 
model transformations, rules or code-generation templates. Use of OCL makes UML class 
diagrams more precise as OCL is used to specify invariants of class attributes and pre-conditions 
and post-conditions of class methods [43].  
 
OCL helps in achieving automation of software development in UML. A combination of UML 
and OCL helps developers generating effective and coherent models. OCL plays a key role in 
Model Driven Architecture by enabling platform-specific models to communicate with platform-
independent models [44].  
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A UML class diagram 'Person' and its respective attributes 'name', 'address' and 'birthdate' is 
shown in Figure 18. The generated OCL constraints are shown in Figure 19 [45]. 
 
 
Figure 18: Example of UML class diagram 
 
1. context Person 
2. inv fields_nonnull: self.birthdate -> notEmpty() and 
self.name -> notEmpty()and self.address -> notEmpty() 
 
3. context Person :: getAge():int 
4. post positive_age : result >= 0 
 
5. context Person :: setName(name:String): void 
6. pre name_given: name -> notEmpty() 
7. post name_set: self.name = name 
Figure 19: OCL constraints for Class Person 
 
Figure 19, line 2 defines an invariant for class 'Person' which indicate all three attributes to be 
'non-empty'. Next, getAge() method (line 3) needs to satisfy the post-condition that age must be 
a positive integer number (line 4). The method setName (line 5) has a pre-condition in line 6 
which checks if the name attribute is not empty. In line 7, once the pre-condition is satisfied, the 
given name is set to the name of the particular user. 
 
4.4 Proposed OCL Fault-Injection Based Testing Approach 
Ideally, we like to have a set of pre-conditions and post-conditions (expressed in OCL) to apply 
fault injection on these conditions as part of the test case generation process. However, we rarely 
have the design level information for a given implementation (e.g., class diagrams and 
dependency). Given that, we follow a process (Figure 20) to capture set of conditions from 
program source code. 
39 
 
 
Figure 20: Generation of pre and post-conditions 
 
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions 
Step 1. Examine the source code, identify functionalities of applications related to LDAP query 
generation and invocation, and obtain class diagrams capturing the key class attributes that 
may contribute to be part of pre and post-conditions. 
Step 2. Develop a flow chart for application functionality. 
Step 3. Record needed pre and post-conditions required for successful completion of functionalities. 
The conditions are expressed in terms of class attributes captured in step 1. 
Step 4. For each path in the flow chart, combine all pre and post-conditions by removing duplicate pre-
conditions. 
 
Once the list of pre and post-conditions is identified, we apply the fault adequate test case 
generation algorithm discussed next. 
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Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator 
Let the input and output for the fault adequate test case generator be given as follows: 
 
Input: D ∈ {pre-conditions, post-conditions} 
The intended design D is composed of valid pre-conditions and post-conditions, which when satisfied 
will prevent the occurrence of LDAP injection attacks. 
 
Output: T = {test cases revealing LDAP injection attack types}  
 
Here, T = {t1, t2, ....} where tk = <ik, ok>; and ik is the k
th
 input and ok is the k
th 
output 
 
Step 1: Given that the intended design is D, generate D' from D  
 where  D' is the faulty design and  
           D' ∈ {pre', post'}, 
 where pre' and post' define faulty pre-conditions and post-conditions respectively. 
            pre' is generated by randomly replacing one of the logical operator and relational operator 
with other from the sets {OR, AND, NOT} and {≤, ≥}         
Step 2: Define an input i such that i satisfies pre ∨ pre'.  
  (∨ indicates logical OR) 
Step 3: Apply input i to D and D'. 
            Observe outputs o and o' for D(i) and  D'(i) respectively. 
If D(i) ≠ D'(i), accept the input i and include it in the set T = T ∪ {<i, o>} (good test case) 
           If D(i) = D'(i), reject input i and move to step 2. 
 
 
In the next Chapter, we discuss the evaluation of our proposed approach to a number of case 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Case Studies and Evaluation 
 
5.1 Overview 
In this Chapter, we demonstrate example applications of test case generation based on OCL Fault 
Injection algorithm discussed in Chapter 4. We evaluate test case generation approach with an 
open source PHP LDAP web application Self Service Password [46] which has been reported to 
contain LDAP injection vulnerability in Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [47]. 
Moreover, we demonstrate our approach for a developed web application having LDAP injection 
vulnerabilities. We deploy both applications in an Apache web server having phpLDAPadmin 
configured appropriately [48].  
 
5.2 Case Study 1: Self Service Password (Login Bypass, Information Disclosure) 
Self Service Password can be used to reset the password of an LDAP entity (common entity or 
cn). We have used the source code of Self Service Password related to password change 
functionalities to generate the pre and post-conditions. We find that there are three ways to 
change password: reset by security questions, reset by old and new password and reset by 
sending token in email. We evaluate our approach for reset by sending token in email option.  
  
We first show the legitimate way of password reset in Figure 21. We assume that user Sam Price 
has a legitimate login ID as sprice with a valid email ID given as x@xyz.com. The reset password 
link will be sent to the email ID and the user can change his password by clicking on the link 
provided in the email. 
  
Figure 22 shows that an attacker can access the password reset link by providing input 
containing wild card character (sp*) in the login ID field and email as x@xyz.com. Figure 23 
shows that providing the above inputs result in receiving a password reset link (with token 
information). This attack is an example of information disclosure and may further lead to login 
bypass type of LDAP injection attack.  
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Figure 21: Correct technique of changing password in Self Service Password 
 
 
Figure 22: Attacker using '*' wildcard to access the system 
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Figure 23: Confirmation email sent to the attacker 
 
We now discuss the process for generation of pre and post-conditions (presented in Chapter 4). 
The PHP code for vulnerable version of Self Service Password application is shown in Figure 24. 
 
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions 
Step 1: The PHP code of the vulnerable version of Self Service Password is shown in Figure 24. 
Here, Lines 2 and 8 retrieve Email ID and Login ID. Lines 22-24 use the login and email to form 
LDAP query. Line 22 replaces the occurrence of the text '{login}' in variable '$ldap_filter' 
with the value that is assigned to the variable '$login' which is the user entered value in login 
field. Line 22 is not filtering out the meta characters which becomes the part of LDAP search and 
leads to LDAP injection attacks. Line 13 connects with LDAP server, and Line 17 executes the 
generated LDAP query. 
 
... 
1. if (isset($_POST["mail"]) and $_POST["mail"]){ 
2.   $mail = $_POST["mail"];  
3. } 
4. else {  
5.   $result = "mailrequired";  
6. } 
7. if (isset($_REQUEST["login"]) and $_REQUEST["login"]) {  
8.   $login = $_REQUEST["login"];  
9. } 
10.else {  
11.  $result = "loginrequired";  
12.} 
// omitted code ... 
13. $ldap = ldap_connect($ldap_url); 
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14. ldap_set_option($ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3); 
15. ldap_set_option($ldap, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, 0); 
16. if ( isset($ldap_binddn) && isset($ldap_bindpw) ) { 
17.  $bind = ldap_bind($ldap, $ldap_binddn, $ldap_bindpw); 
18. }  
19. else { 
20.  $bind = ldap_bind($ldap); 
21. } 
// omitted code ... 
22. $ldap_filter = str_replace("{login}", $login, $ldap_filter); 
23. $search = ldap_search($ldap, $ldap_base, $ldap_filter); 
// omitted code ... 
24.  $mailValues = ldap_get_values($ldap, $entry, $mail_attribute); 
// omitted code ... 
Figure 24: PHP code for vulnerable version of Self Service Password application 
 
Based on source code, we derive the class diagram as shown in Figure 25. Here, we show three 
classes each representing password change for three different ways. In particular, password reset 
by email has four attributes (loginid, emailid, logincount, emailcount) and three methods 
(isValid(), isRegistered() and isTokenSent()).  
 
 
Figure 25: Class diagram for Self Service Password application 
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Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 26 for email token-based password reset 
functionality. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or end 
state and a diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.  
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Figure 26: Flowchart for password change based on reset token sent via email 
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Step 3: Figure 26 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful password 
change by token sent to email. For example, the path showing successful password change 
requires that Login ID and Email ID be not empty (loginid ≠ empty AND emailid ≠ empty), 
Email ID is valid syntactically (isValid(emailid)), Email and Login ID counts are one, and Email 
ID belongs to known registered email address (isRegisteredEmail(emailid)). The post-condition 
is receiving a token by Email (captured as isTokenSent=TRUE). Similarly, we can capture pre 
and post-conditions for other paths that would result in error message (total five paths). We can 
obtain a set of pre and post-conditions for all six paths (P1-P6). 
 
Step 4: Table 5 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the six paths based on 
Figure 26. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed. 
 
Table 5: Pre and post-conditions for Self Service Password 
Path pre-conditions post-conditions 
P1 (Success) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
isTokenSent() 
P2 (Error1) !(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) !isTokenSent() 
P3 (Error2) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
!isValid(email) 
!isTokenSent() 
P4 (Error3) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid(email) ∧ 
!(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) 
!isTokenSent() 
P5 (Error4) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
!isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
!isTokenSent() 
P6 (Error5) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
!isRegisteredEmail (emailid) ∧ 
!isTokenSent() 
N/A 
 
Now, we apply fault injection for each of the obtained pre-conditions (which becomes part of D) 
to generate test cases. Below we illustrate the test case generation for path P1. Similarly, we can 
apply for paths P2 - P6. Next, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator 
Algorithm (discussed in Chapter 4).  
48 
 
Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator 
Step 1: From D we obtain D'. We generate altered pre-conditions (pre'). Table 6 shows five 
examples of altered pre-conditions (pre') for P1 where we replaced ∧ with ∨ randomly. This is 
not an exhaustive list of all possible pre' but we show some examples for illustrative purposes. 
Each expression relates to two input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields: loginid and 
emailid. We assume that valid emailid is x@xyz.com and valid loginid is sprice. We also assume 
that * is an invalid character and is not permitted as any part of the inputs for this application. 
These set of valid inputs along with meta-characters will be combined to generate test cases that 
we discuss next. 
 
Table 6: Altered pre-conditions for Self Service Password (P1) 
Example pre pre' 
 
1 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∨ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid)  
2 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧  
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∨ loginCount = 1) ∨ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
3 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∨ 
isValid (email) ∨  
(emailCount = 1 ∨ loginCount = 1) ∨  
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
4 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∨ 
isValid (email) ∨ 
(emailCount = 1 ∨ (loginCount = 1) ∨  
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
5 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∧ loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ emailid ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (email) ∧ 
(emailCount = 1 ∨(loginCount = 1) ∧ 
isRegisteredEmail (emailid) 
 
Step 2: The loginid in input i1 is sp* and emailid is a legitimate emailid given as x@xyz.com.  For 
checking if generated test input i1, from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis as 
shown in Table 7. Here, the second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in 
Table 7 show whether the test input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre 
∨ pre’ based on step 2 in the algorithm.  
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Step 3: Then, we apply each of the inputs i1-i5 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from original 
program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column indicates if 
the particular test case can be included in set T or not. A test input is added when o and o’are 
dissimilar. 
 
Table 7: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Self Service Password 
(P1) 
 
From Table 7, the first four test cases are added in test set T, and it is being enhanced T = T ∪ 
{(i1, o1), (i2, o2), (i3, o3), (i4, o4)} with vulnerability revealing test cases {< i1, o1>, < i2, o2>, < i3, 
o3>, < i4, o4>}.  
 
We now discuss more on each of the test inputs. For example, we assume that the loginid in 
input i1 is given as sp* and the emailid is registered in the system. The loginid in input i2 is given 
as sp* and the emailid is not registered in the system. Input i3 is given as a legitimate loginid 
sprice and the emailid is *. Input i4 has loginid as sp* and the emailid is *. 
In Table 7, rows 1, 2, 3 and 4 show input i. Columns 3 and 4 show whether i satisfies pre and 
pre' (not satisfied for pre, satisfied for pre'). Column 5 shows that i satisfies pre ∨ pre' based on 
# Input 
pre 
satisfied? 
pre' 
satisfied? 
pre 
∨ 
pre' 
Output D(i) Output D'(i) 
Include in 
set T? 
1 
i1: 
loginid = "sp*", 
emailid = 
"x@xyz.com" 
No Yes Yes 
o1: 
isTokenSent = 
FALSE 
o'1: 
isTokenSent  = 
TRUE 
Yes 
2 
i2: 
loginid = "sp*", 
emailid = 
"p@xyz.com" 
No Yes Yes 
o2: 
isTokenSent =  
FALSE 
o'2: 
isTokenSent  = 
TRUE 
Yes 
3 
i3: 
loginid = "sprice", 
emailid = "*" 
No Yes Yes 
o3: 
isTokenSent = 
FALSE 
o'3: 
isTokenSent  = 
TRUE 
Yes 
4 
i4: 
loginid = "sp*", 
emailid = "*" 
No Yes Yes 
o4: 
isTokenSent = 
FALSE 
o'4: 
isTokenSent  = 
TRUE 
Yes 
5 
i5: 
loginid = "sprice", 
emailid = 
"x@xyz.com" 
Yes Yes Yes 
o5: 
isTokenSent = 
TRUE 
o'5: 
isTokenSent  = 
TRUE 
No 
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step 2 in the algorithm. Then, we apply input i in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from D and 
D’. The last column indicates if the particular test case can be included in set T or not, based on 
conditions in step 4 (included for i1 - i4).  
 
For the last input i5, we assume that the loginid is sprice and emailid is x@xyz.com, which are 
both valid. Though the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after applying to D and D’ 
become the same. Thus, it is not added in test set T.  
 
Therefore, the final test set T after applying the algorithm results in selected test inputs as 
follows: {<sp*, x@xyz.com>, <sp*, p@xyz.com>, <sprice, *>, <sp*, *>}. As we apply these 
generated test inputs on the target application, we find that i1, i2, and i4 have the capability of 
revealing login bypass injection attacks, and i3 can be applied for discovering privilege escalation 
attack. 
 
Note that all test cases may not be suitable for discovering vulnerabilities. Further, multiple test 
cases may reveal the same vulnerability (e.g., both i1 and i2 can reveal login bypass attack). Our 
approach enables developers to consider critical program input variables and program paths that 
can contribute to LDAP injection vulnerabilities. Thus, our approach can generate and select 
effective test cases revealing LDAP injection attacks based on altered program path constraints 
expressed in OCL. 
 
5.3 Case study 2: Custom Web Application (Login Bypass) 
In this Section, we demonstrate the test case generation for Login Bypass injection attack. First 
we show the process for generation of pre and post-conditions.  
 
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions 
Step 1: We develop a class diagram as shown in Figure 27 capturing the key class attributes in 
the source code. 
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Figure 27: Class diagram for Custom application (Login Bypass) 
 
Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 28 for login bypass LDAP injection attack 
type. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or end state and a 
diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.  
 
Step 3: Figure 28 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful login bypass 
operation. For example, the path showing successful password change requires that Login ID and 
Password be not empty (loginid ≠ empty AND password ≠ empty), Login ID is valid 
syntactically (isValid(loginid)), Login ID count is one, and Password matches to the Login ID of 
the particular user (isMatching(password)). The post-condition is user login (captured as 
isLogin=TRUE). Similarly, we can capture pre and post-conditions for other paths that would 
result in error message (total five paths). We can obtain a set of pre and post-conditions for all 
six paths (P1-P6). 
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Figure 28: Flowchart for login bypass type of LDAP injection attack 
 
Step 4: Table 8 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the six paths based on 
Figure 28. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed. 
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Table 8: Pre and post-conditions for Login Bypass 
Path pre-conditions post-conditions 
P1 (Success) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∧ 
isMatching (password) 
isLogin() 
P2 (Error1) !(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) !isLogin() 
P3 (Error2) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
!isValid(loginid) 
!isLogin() 
P4 (Error3) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid(loginid) ∧ 
!(loginCount = 1) 
!isLogin() 
P5 (Error4) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (loginid) ∧ 
(loginCount = 1) ∧ 
!isMatching (password) 
!isLogin() 
P6 (Error5) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (loginid) ∧ 
(loginCount = 1) ∧ 
!isMatching (password) ∧ 
!isLogin() 
N/A 
 
Now, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm to illustrate the 
test case generation for path P1 (Table 8).  
 
Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator 
Step 1: From D we obtain D'. We generate altered pre- conditions (pre'). Table 9 shows two 
examples of altered pre-conditions (pre') for P1 where we replaced ∧ with ∨ randomly. Table 9 
shows two examples (non-exhaustive) of pre' that we generate by randomly substituting AND 
with OR in pre (changes are shown in bold in the third column). Each expression relates to two 
input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields: loginid and password. We assume that valid 
emailid is x@xyz.com and valid loginid is sprice. We also assume that * is an invalid character 
and is not permitted as any part of the inputs for this application. These set of valid inputs along 
with meta-characters will be combined to generate test cases that we discuss next. 
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Table 9: Altered pre-conditions and test inputs for Login Bypass (P1) 
Example pre pre' 
1 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∧ 
isMatching (password) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∨ 
isValid (loginid) ∨ loginCount = 1 ∨ 
isMatching (password) 
2 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∧ 
isMatching (password) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ password ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid (loginid) ∧ loginCount = 1 ∨ 
isMatching (password) 
 
Step 2: The loginid in input i1 is given as *)(uid=*))(|(uid=*) and password is given as abcdef.  
For checking if generated test input i1, from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis 
as shown in Table 10. Here, the second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in 
Table 10 show whether the test input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre 
∨ pre’ based on step 2 in the algorithm.  
 
Step 3: Then, we apply each of the inputs i1 - i2 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from original 
program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column indicates if 
the particular test case can be included in set T or not. A test input is added when o and o’are 
dissimilar. From Table 10, the first test case can be added in test set T, and it is being enhanced T 
= T ∪ {i1, o1} with vulnerability revealing test case < i1, o1>.  
 
Table 10: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Login Bypass (P1) 
 
For example, we assume that the loginid in input i2 is given as sprice and the password is a 
legitimate password as prices. Though the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after 
applying it on D and D’ remains the same. Thus, test input i2 is not added in test set T.  
 
# Input 
pre 
satisfied? 
pre' 
satisfied? 
pre 
∨ 
pre' 
Output 
D(i) 
Output 
D'(i) 
Include 
in set T? 
1 
i1: 
loginid = 
"*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*)", 
password = "abcdef" 
No Yes Yes 
o1: 
isLogin 
= TRUE 
o'1: 
isLogin  = 
FALSE 
Yes 
2 
i2: 
loginid = "sprice", 
password = "prices" 
Yes Yes Yes 
o2: 
isLogin 
= TRUE 
o'2: 
isLogin  = 
TRUE 
No 
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Therefore, the final test set T after applying the algorithm results in selected test input and output 
as: {<*)(uid=*))(|(uid=*), abcdef>}. As we apply this generated test inputs on the target 
application, we find that i1 has the capability of revealing login bypass injection attack. 
 
5.4 Case study 3: Custom Web Application (Privilege Escalation) 
In this Section, we demonstrate the test case generation for Privilege Escalation type of LDAP 
injection attack. We apply the process for generation of pre and post-conditions below. 
 
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions 
Step 1: We develop a class diagram as shown in Figure 29 capturing the key class attributes in 
the source code. 
 
 
Figure 29: Class diagram for Custom application (Privilege Escalation) 
 
Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 30 for privilege escalation LDAP injection 
attack type. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or end state 
and a diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.  
 
Step 3: Figure 30 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful privilege 
escalation scenarios.  
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Figure 30: Flowchart for privilege escalation type of LDAP injection attack 
 
Step 4: Table 11 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the five paths based on 
Figure 30. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed. 
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Table 11: Pre and post-conditions for Privilege Escalation 
Path pre-conditions post-conditions 
P1 (Success) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ isOu(loginid) = 
Ou(document) ∧ isSecuritylevel(loginid) = 
Securitylevel(document) 
Display 
Documents 
P2 (Error1) !(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) 
Display 
Documents fail 
P3 (Error2) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
!(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) 
Display 
Documents fail 
P4 (Error3) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ !(isOu(loginid) = 
Ou(document)) 
Display 
Documents fail 
P5 (Error4) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ isOu(loginid) = 
Ou(document) ∧ !(isSecuritylevel(loginid) = 
Securitylevel(document)) 
N/A 
 
Now, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm for paths P1 and 
P3.  
 
Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator 
Step 1: We generate altered pre-conditions (pre'). Table 12 shows three examples of altered pre-
conditions (pre') where the first and second rows correspond to P1 and the third row corresponds 
to P3. Here, we randomly replaced ∧ with ∨ (changes are shown in bold font in the third 
column). Each expression relates to two input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields: 
loginid and ou. We assume that valid emailid is x@xyz.com and valid loginid is sprice. We also 
assume that * is an invalid character for this application. These set of valid inputs along with 
meta-characters will be combined to generate test cases that we discuss next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Table 12: Altered pre-conditions and test inputs for Privilege Escalation (P1 and P3) 
Example pre pre' 
1 
(P1) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∧ 
isSecuritylevel(loginid) = 
Securitylevel(document) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∨ 
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∧ 
isSecuritylevel(loginid) = 
Securitylevel(document) 
2  
(P1) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∧ 
isSecuritylevel(loginid) = 
Securitylevel(document) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∨ 
isOu(loginid) = Ou(document) ∨ 
isSecuritylevel(loginid) = 
Securitylevel(document) 
3  
(P3) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∧ 
!(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) 
(loginid ≠ empty ∧ ou ≠ empty) ∨ 
!(getSecuritylevel() ∧ ou ≠ empty) 
 
Step 2: The loginid in input i1 is given as sprice and ou is given as *.  For checking if generated 
test input i1, from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis as shown in Table 13. 
Here, the second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 13 show 
whether the test input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre ∨ pre’ based 
on step 2 in the algorithm.  
 
Step 3: We apply each of the inputs i1 - i3 in columns 6 and 7 (Table 13) to obtain output from 
original program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column 
indicates if the particular test case can be included in set T or not, based on conditions in step 4. 
A test input is added when o and o’are dissimilar. From Table 13, test cases 1 and 2 can be 
added in test set T, and it is being enhanced T = T ∪ {(i1, o1), (i2, o2)} with vulnerability revealing 
test cases {< i1, o1>, < i2, o2>}.  
 
Let us consider the example shown in the first row (Table 13). The loginid is given as sprice and 
ou is given as *. Columns 3 and 4 show whether i satisfies pre and pre' (not satisfied for pre, 
satisfied for pre'). Column 5 shows that i satisfies pre ∨ pre' based on step 2 in the algorithm. 
Then, we apply input i1 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from D and D’. The last column 
indicates if the particular test case can be included in set T or not, which indicates that i1 can be 
included as a test case. Similarly, i2 can be included in set T. 
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Table 13: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Privilege Escalation (P1 
and P3) 
 
Let us consider the third example. We assume that loginid is sprice and ou is SalesRep. Though 
the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after applying on D and D’ remains the same. 
Thus, it is not added in test set T. 
 
Therefore, the final test set T after applying Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm results 
in test input and output as: {<sprice,*>, <sp*,*>}. As we apply this generated test inputs on the 
target application, we find that i1 and i2 have the capability of revealing privilege escalation 
injection attacks. 
 
5.5 Case study 4: Custom Web Application (Information Alteration) 
In this Section, we demonstrate the test case generation for Information Alteration type of LDAP 
injection attack. We apply the four steps of process for generation of pre and post-conditions 
below. 
 
Process for Generation of pre and post-conditions 
Step 1: We develop a class diagram as shown in Figure 31 capturing the key class attributes in 
the source code. 
# Input 
pre 
satisfied? 
pre' 
satisfied? 
pre 
∨ 
pre' 
Output D(i) Output D'(i) 
Include 
in set T? 
1 
i1: 
loginid = " sprice ", 
ou = "*" 
No Yes Yes 
o1: 
Display Documents 
= FALSE 
o'1: 
Display Documents 
fail  = TRUE 
Yes 
2 
i2: 
loginid = " sp* ", 
ou = "*" 
No Yes Yes 
o2: 
Display Documents 
= FALSE 
o'2: 
Display Documents 
fail  = TRUE 
Yes 
3 
i3: 
loginid = "sprice" 
ou = "SalesRep" 
Yes Yes Yes 
o3: 
Display Documents 
= TRUE 
o'3: 
Display Documents 
= TRUE 
No 
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Figure 31: Class diagram for Custom application (Information Alteration) 
 
Step 2: We develop a flow chart as shown in Figure 32 for information alteration LDAP 
injection attack type. Here, a rectangle means steps (input or output), an ellipse means the start or 
end state and a diamond is a decision making step where testing of conditions are performed.  
 
Step 3: Figure 32 shows various paths related to both successful and unsuccessful information 
alteration scenarios.  
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Figure 32: Flowchart for information alteration type of LDAP injection attack 
 
Step 4: Table 14 shows the combined pre and post-conditions for each of the four paths based on 
Figure 32. There is no duplicate condition, so no reduction of conditions needs to be performed. 
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Table 14: Pre and post-conditions for Information Alteration 
Path pre-conditions post-conditions 
P1 (Success) 
(replacewith ≠ empty ∧ dn ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid(dn) ∧ (isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn)) 
Replace Entry 
P2 (Error1) !(replacewith ≠ empty) 
Replace Entry 
fail 
P3 (Error2) !(dn ≠ empty) 
Replace Entry 
fail 
P4 (Error3) !(isValid(dn)) 
Replace Entry 
fail 
P5 (Error4) !(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn)) N/A 
 
Now, we apply the three steps of Fault adequate test case generator Algorithm for path P1.  
 
Algorithm: Fault adequate test case generator 
Step 1: From D we obtain D'. We generate altered pre- conditions (pre'). Table 15 shows two 
examples of altered pre-conditions (pre') for P1 where we replaced ∧ with ∨ randomly. This is 
not an exhaustive list of all possible pre' but we show some examples for illustrative purposes. 
Each expression relates to two input variables (or test inputs) represent two fields: replacewith 
and dn. We assume that valid dn is uid=sprice, cn=SalesRep, ou=Sales,dc=ubuntuldap2. We 
also assume that * is an invalid character and is not permitted as any part of the inputs for this 
application. These set of valid inputs along with meta-characters will be combined to generate 
test cases that we discuss next. We discuss the input i1 in which a document is being replaced.  
 
Step 2: The replacewith in input i1 is given as randomlink and dn is given as uid=jreed, 
cn=SeniorMgmt, ou=SeniorMgmt, dc=ubuntuldap2.  For checking if generated test input i1, 
from step 1 can satisfy pre ∨ pre’, we do further analysis as shown in Table 16. Here, the 
second column shows a set of test inputs (i). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 16 show whether the test 
input i satisfies pre and pre’. Column 5 shows that i1 satisfies pre ∨ pre’.  
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Table 15: Altered pre-conditions and test inputs for Information Alteration (P1) 
Example pre pre' 
1 
(replacewith ≠ empty ∧ 
dn ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid(dn) ∧ 
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn)) 
(replacewith ≠ empty ∧ 
dn ≠ empty) ∨ 
isValid(dn) ∧ 
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn)) 
2 
(replacewith ≠ empty ∧ 
dn ≠ empty) ∧ 
isValid(dn) ∧ 
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn)) 
(replacewith ≠ empty ∨ 
dn ≠ empty) ∨ 
isValid(dn) ∧ 
(isOu(loginid) = Ou(dn)) 
 
Step 3: We apply each of the inputs i1 and i2 in columns 6 and 7 to obtain output from original 
program (D) and altered program (D’) under o and o’, respectively. The last column indicates if 
the particular test case can be included in set T or not. A test input is added when o and o’ are 
dissimilar. 
 
From Table 16, the first test case can be added to test set T, and it is being enhanced T = T ∪ {i1, 
o1} with vulnerability revealing test case < i1, o1>.  
 
Table 16: Generation of test cases with altered pre and post-conditions for Information Alteration 
(P1) 
 
 
For example, we assume that the replacewith in input i2 is given as correctlink and the dn is the 
dn of the user logged in. Though the input satisfies both pre and pre', the output after applying it 
on D and D’ remains same. Thus, it is not added to test set T.  
 
#
  
Input 
pre 
satisfied? 
pre' 
satisfied? 
pre 
∨ 
pre' 
Output D(i) Output D'(i) 
Include 
in set 
T? 
1 
i1: 
replacewith = "randomlink" 
dn = "uid=jreed,cn=SeniorMgmt,ou= 
SeniorMgmt,dc=ubuntuldap2" 
No Yes Yes 
o4: 
ReplaceEntry 
= TRUE 
o'4: 
ReplaceEntry  
= FALSE 
Yes 
2 
i2: 
replacewith = "correctlink" 
dn = "uid=jreed,cn=SeniorMgmt,ou= 
SeniorMgmt,dc=ubuntuldap2" 
Yes Yes Yes 
o5: 
isLogin = 
TRUE 
o'5: 
isLogin  = 
TRUE 
No 
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Therefore, the final test set T after applying the algorithm results in test input and output as: 
{<replacewith="randomlink";dn=uid=jreed,cn=SeniorMgmt,ou=SeniorMgmt,dc=ubuntuldap2>}. 
As we apply this generated test inputs on the target application, we find that i1 has the capability 
of revealing information alteration injection attack. 
 
Thus, our approach enables developers to generate effective test cases based on OCL fault 
injection approach to detect LDAP injection vulnerabilities. 
 
The next Chapter demonstrates tool implementation in which we have automated the process of 
random OR replacement. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Tool Implementation 
 
6.1 Overview 
In this Chapter, we demonstrate a tool which can be used for the selection of test cases. The test 
cases mentioned earlier in Chapter 5 were generated manually. We demonstrate implementation 
of tool by using Self Service Password and Login Bypass case studies (mentioned earlier in 
Chapter 5, Section 5.2 and 5.3) as examples. We apply a common measure to assess the quality 
of generated test cases called Mutation Score (MS) [49]. It is the ratio between the number of test 
cases included in the test set T to the total number of test cases generated. The Mutation Score is 
affected by the combination of user inputs. When the input values include high number of 
erroneous (invalid) inputs, the algorithm tends to generate high number of test cases to be 
included in the test set T. For example, when the user inputs are all valid, the number of 
generated test cases that can be included in the test set T are either zero or a minimum number 
possible. This leads to a low mutation score. On the other hand, when the inputs are all invalid, it 
is most likely that all or a high number of generated test cases are included in the test set T, 
leading to a high mutation score. 
 
6.2 Tool implementation for Self Service Password 
 
Example 1: 
First, we have the questions based on the application of Self Service Password. We defined six 
attributes based on the application implementation to represent pre-conditions. Depending upon 
the options selected at this point, the tool randomly substitutes AND with OR and provides us all 
the possible combinations for this substitution. Developers are required to generate initial test 
cases that can satisfy the generated constraints. 
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Figure 33: Questions based on Self Service Password application 
 
 
Figure 34: Selected options for Self Service Password application (Example 1) 
 
For example, the options are selected as shown in Figure 34. For the given selection an example 
input can be Login: sp*; Email: x@xyz.com. 
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Boolean values are assigned to each entity (field) as shown in Figure 35. These values are based 
on the selection from the previous page. Also, our pre-condition for the Self Service password 
application is [(a ∧ b) ∧ c ∧ (d ∧ e) ∧ f] which should be satisfied for a successful operation. 
 
 
Figure 35: Assigned Boolean values based on selection (Example 1) 
 
Once we have the Boolean values assigned depending on the given selection, the options 
available for logical OR Replacements are shown in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36: Available OR replacement options 
 
Let us check the selection of test cases for each OR replacement option. 
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4 OR Replacement Result Set: 
 
 
Based on the last column of the 4 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
5/5 or 100%. 
 
3 OR Replacement Result Set: 
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Based on the last column of the 3 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
10/10 or 100%. 
 
2 OR Replacement Result Set: 
 
 
Based on the last column of the 2 OR Replacement screenshot, eight test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
8/10 or 80%. 
 
1 OR Replacement Result Set: 
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Based on the last column of the 1 OR Replacement screenshot, two test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
2/5 or 40%. 
 
Example 2: 
First, we have the questions based on the application of Self Service Password. For example, the 
options are selected as shown in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37: Selected options for Self Service Password application (Example 2) 
 
Boolean values are assigned to each entity (field) as shown in Figure 38. These values are based 
on the selection from the previous page. Also, our pre-condition for the Self Service password 
application is [(a ∧ b) ∧ c ∧ (d ∧ e) ∧ f] which should be satisfied for a successful operation.  
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Figure 38: Assigned Boolean values based on selection (Example 2) 
 
Let us check the selection of test cases for each OR replacement option. 
 
4 OR Replacement Result Set: 
 
 
Based on the last column of the 4 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
5/5 or 100%. 
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3 OR Replacement Result Set: 
 
 
Based on the last column of the 3 OR Replacement screenshot, nine test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
9/10 or 90%. 
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2 OR Replacement Result Set: 
 
 
Based on the last column of the 2 OR Replacement screenshot, seven test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
7/10 or 70%. 
 
1 OR Replacement Result Set: 
 
 
Based on the last column of the 1 OR Replacement screenshot, two test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
2/5 or 40%. 
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6.3 Tool implementation for Custom web application (Login Bypass) 
First, we have the questions based on custom web application for Login Bypass. We defined 
three attributes based on the implementation to represent pre-conditions. Depending upon the 
options selected at this point, the tool helps us randomly substituting AND with OR and gives us 
all the possible combinations for this substitution.  
 
 
Figure 39: Questions based on custom web application for Login Bypass 
 
 
Figure 40: Selected options for Self Service Password application 
 
For example, the options are selected as shown in Figure 40. For the given selection an example 
input can be Login: sprice; Password: (empty) 
 
Boolean values are assigned to each entity (field) as shown in Figure 41. These values are based 
on the selection from the previous page. Also, our pre-condition for custom application for login 
bypass is [(a ∧ b) ∧ c] which should be satisfied for a successful operation. 
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Figure 41: Assigned Boolean values based on selection 
 
Once we have the Boolean values assigned depending on the given selection, the options 
available for logical OR Replacements are shown in Figure 42. 
 
 
Figure 42: Available OR replacement option 
 
Let us check the selection of test cases for OR replacement option. 
 
1 OR Replacement Result Set: 
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Based on the last column of the 1 OR Replacement screenshot, all test cases are relevant to 
detect an attack, therefore are included in the test set T. This leads to a Mutation Score (MS) of 
2/2 or 100%. 
 
Thus, the developed tool helps in selection of test cases which might be vulnerable to injection 
attacks, thereby allowing developers to develop secure web applications. 
 
In the next Chapter, we present the dissemination of our research results. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Dissemination of Research Results 
 
This chapter shows dissemination of thesis results as poster presentations and conference papers. 
Below we list the title, abstract, and venue for each dissemination. 
 
Detection of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Query Injection attacks in Web 
Applications 
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. 
Poster presentation. Kennesaw State University - Computer Science Student Expo 2015, Marietta, 
GA, USA, December 2015 
 
 
 
 
OCL Fault Injection-Based Testing of LDAP Query Injection Attacks 
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. 
Conference paper submission in progress. 
 
Abstract 
LDAP is a directory access protocol commonly used in web applications to provide lookup 
information and enforcing authentication mechanism. However, poorly implemented web 
applications suffer from LDAP injection vulnerabilities that might lead to security breaches 
such as login bypassing, privilege escalation, information disclosure, and information 
alteration. Testing for the presence of LDAP injection attacks can help to discover 
vulnerabilities early and fix implementation. Towards this direction, generating effective test 
cases is important and requires systematic approach. This paper proposes fault injection-
based testing of LDAP injection attacks based on program implementation. We extract design 
level information and constraints (in the form of pre-conditions and post-conditions) 
highlighting behaviors that should be maintained throughout application runtime. We express 
the constraints using a popular modeling language called OCL. We randomly alter the 
captured pre-conditions and post-conditions and solve them to generate suitable test cases 
that may have the capability to check for the presence of LDAP injection vulnerabilities. We 
proposed needed algorithms to implement our test case generation approach. We did an initial 
case study for an open source PHP application. The analysis shows that our approach can 
generate effective test cases to discover LDAP injection vulnerabilities.  
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Classification of Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Query Injection Attacks and 
Mitigation Techniques  
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. 
Conference Proceedings. Proceedings of 2015 International Conference on Collaboration 
Technologies and Systems (CTS 2015), Atlanta, GA, USA, June 2015, IEEE CS Press, pp. 337-
344, ISBN: 978-1-4673-7648-8/15 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is used in a large number of web 
applications, and therefore, different types of LDAP injection attacks are becoming common. 
These injection attacks take advantage of an application not validating inputs before being 
used as part of LDAP queries. An attacker can provide inputs that may result in the alteration 
of intended LDAP query structure. The attacks can lead to various types of security breaches 
including Login Bypassing, Information Disclosure, Privilege Escalation, and Information 
Alteration. Despite many research efforts to prevent LDAP injection attacks, many web 
applications remain vulnerable to such attacks. In particular, there has been little attention 
given to implement and test secure web applications that can mitigate LDAP query injection 
attacks. More attention has been given to prevent Structured Query Language (SQL) injection 
attacks but these mitigation techniques cannot be directly applied in order to prevent LDAP 
injection attacks. This work provides analysis and classification of various types of LDAP 
injection attacks and mitigation techniques used to prevent them, and it highlights the 
differences between SQL and LDAP injection attacks. 
Abstract 
LDAP is a directory access protocol commonly used in web applications to provide lookup 
information and enforcing authentication mechanism. However, poorly implemented web 
applications suffer from LDAP injection vulnerabilities that might lead to security breaches 
such as login bypassing, privilege escalation, information disclosure, and information 
alteration. Testing for the presence of LDAP injection attacks can help to discover 
vulnerabilities early and fix implementation. Towards this direction, generating effective test 
cases is important and requires systematic approach. This paper proposes fault injection-
based testing of LDAP injection attacks based on program implementation. We extract design 
level information and constraints (in the form of pre-conditions and post-conditions) 
highlighting behaviors that should be maintained throughout application runtime. We express 
the constraints using a popular modeling language called OCL. We randomly alter the 
captured pre-conditions and post-conditions and solve them to generate suitable test cases 
that may have the capability to check for the presence of LDAP injection vulnerabilities. We 
proposed needed algorithms to implement our test case generation approach. We did an initial 
case study for an open source PHP application. The analysis shows that our approach can 
generate effective test cases to discover LDAP injection vulnerabilities.  
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OCL Fault-Injection Based Testing of LDAP Query Injection Attacks 
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. 
Poster presentation. Kennesaw State University - Computer Science Student Expo 2015, 
Kennesaw, GA, USA, April 2015 
 
 
 
 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Query Injection Attacks in Web Applications 
Pranahita Bulusu, Hossain Shahriar and Hisham Haddad. 
Poster presentation. Kennesaw State University - Computer Science Student Expo 2014, 
Kennesaw, GA, USA, December 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
LDAP is a popular protocol for Directory Service. Data objects are represented in 
hierarchical form. Web applications relying on LDAP-based data object storing and retrieval 
may suffer from injection attacks due to lack or improper input validation. Common LDAP 
injection attacks include (i) Login Bypassing, (ii) Information Disclosure, (iii) Privilege 
Escalation, and (iv) Information Alteration.  
Abstract 
LDAP is a popular protocol for Directory Service. Data objects are represented in 
hierarchical form. Web applications relying on LDAP-based data object storing and retrieval 
may suffer from injection attacks due to lack or improper input validation. Common LDAP 
injection attacks include (i) Login Bypassing, (ii) Information Disclosure, (iii) Privilege 
Escalation, and (iv) Information Alteration.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
8.1 Conclusions 
LDAP code injection vulnerability can be exploited to perform security breaches in web 
applications such as login bypassing and privilege escalation. Among well-known code injection 
attacks, LDAP injection has been least addressed and they do not share much similarities with 
other types of injection attacks (e.g., SQL Injection) [6]. We proposed OCL fault injection based 
testing approach to generate LDAP injection vulnerability revealing test cases. We extracted 
design level information and constraints (in the form of pre and post-conditions) highlighting 
behaviors that should be maintained throughout application runtime. We expressed the 
constraints using a popular modeling language called OCL. We evaluated our approach with two 
PHP web applications. 
 
From the extensive survey we have done (Chapter 2), we find that most literature works are 
intended for other common code injection attacks, but not specifically for LDAP. We find that 
LDAP and SQL query have dissimilarities and attack inputs and contexts are also dissimilar. 
Further, few literature works have mostly focused on login bypass type of attacks, leaving the 
other three attacks types (information disclosure, privilege escalation, information alteration) 
unaddressed. 
 
We have proposed two algorithms in Chapter 4. The first algorithm addresses the generation of 
pre and post-conditions from application source code where design level information is missing. 
The outcome of the algorithm is a set of combined pre-conditions for various program paths. The 
second algorithm then alters the pre-conditions with the goal of generating and selecting 
effective test cases that can detect the presence of LDAP query injection vulnerabilities.  
 
Chapter 5 illustrates the application of the algorithms for two PHP web applications, including 
one having reported vulnerabilities (login bypass and information disclosure) based on OSVDB. 
We built a custom web application to validate our approach for login bypass, privilege escalation 
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and information alteration type attacks. The evaluation indicates that our approach can generate 
suitable test cases having specific inputs capable of revealing LDAP injection vulnerabilities.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the implementation of a tool to automate the generation of altered pre 
conditions so that developers can assess if a given input is vulnerable to LDAP injection attacks. 
The tools can support the replacement of one logical operator with another, and in multiple 
locations of a given pre-condition. Developers can integrate our proposed OCL fault injection 
based approach to detect LDAP query injection attacks. 
 
The proposed approach is targeted for application developers to be able to generate test sets with 
high mutation score so that included test cases can detect LDAP injection attacks with high 
probability. 
 
8.2 Future Work 
Future work includes applying OCL fault-injection based testing approach to more web 
applications and to test other types of code injection vulnerabilities. We plan to generalize our 
implemented tool’s input taking mechanism so that users can specify their input fields and 
constraints to generate pre-conditions. We like to automate the generation of initial test input and 
alter pre-conditions for relational operators. Currently, our approach does not automatically 
extract class design level information from source code. We plan to develop or employ suitable 
tools for extracting design level information.  
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Appendix A: Source Code 
 
Index.php 
 
Login_action.php 
 
 
<?php 
set_time_limit(30); 
error_reporting(E_ALL); 
ini_set('error_reporting', E_ALL); 
ini_set('display_errors',1); 
 
// config 
$ldapserver = '192.168.1.124'; 
$ldapuser      = $_POST['userid'];   
$ldappass     = $_POST['password']; 
$ldaptree    = "dc=ubuntuldap2"; 
 
 
if (empty($ldapuser) || empty($ldappass)) { 
 echo "Please enter the login credentials. <a 
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back</a>"; 
} else { 
// connect  
$ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP 
server."); 
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3); 
 
 
if($ldapconn) { 
    // binding to ldap server 
    $ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,".$ldaptree, "admin") or 
die ("Please enter valid login credentials. <a 
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back </a>"); 
    // verify binding 
    if ($ldapbind) { 
       
         
   
<center> 
 <h1>Log in to LDAP Server</h1> 
 <form action="login_action.php" method="post"> 
 <input type="text" name="userid"/> 
 <input type="password" name="password"/> 
 <input type="submit" name="submit" /> 
 </form> 
</center> 
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$search = "(&(&(uid=".$ldapuser.")(userPassword=".$ldappass.")))"; 
$sr=ldap_search($ldapconn, $ldaptree, $search); 
$info = ldap_get_entries($ldapconn, $sr); 
if ($info["count"] > 0) { 
  echo "<center>"; 
  echo "You are logged in as: ".$ldapuser." <a 
href='logout.php'>Logout</a><br>"; 
  echo "<h2>Your details</h2>"; 
  $ii=0; 
   for ($i=0; $ii<$info[$i]["count"]; $ii++){ 
       $data = $info[$i][$ii]; 
       echo 
$data.":&nbsp;&nbsp;".$info[$i][$data][0]."<br>"; 
   } 
    
   $ou = $info[0]["ou"][0]; 
   $sec_level = $info[0]["description"][0]; 
       
    
   echo "<table border=1>"; 
   echo "<th colspan=2><h2>Main Menu</h2></th>"; 
   echo "<tr><td><a 
href='searchusers.php?ou=".$ou."'>Search for Users</a></td></tr>"; 
   echo "<tr><td><a 
href='documents.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."&securitylevel=".$sec_lev
el."'>Available Documents</a></td></tr>"; 
   echo "<tr><td><a 
href='add.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Add User</a></td></tr>"; 
   echo "<tr><td><a 
href='replace.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Replace</a></td></tr>"; 
   echo "<tr><td><a 
href='modify.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Update</a></td></tr>"; 
   echo "<tr><td><a 
href='delete.php?uid=".$ldapuser."&ou=".$ou."'>Delete</a></td></tr>"; 
   echo "</table>"; 
   echo "</center>"; 
    
  } else { 
  echo "<center>"; 
  echo "Please check your ID and Password"; 
  echo "</center>";  
  }  
      }   
   } 
// all done? clean up 
ldap_close($ldapconn); 
} 
?> 
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Replace.php 
 
 
 
<?php 
set_time_limit(30); 
error_reporting(E_ALL); 
ini_set('error_reporting', E_ALL); 
ini_set('display_errors',1); 
// config 
$ldapserver = '192.168.1.124'; 
$ldaptree    = "dc=ubuntuldap2"; 
// connect  
$ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP 
server."); 
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3); 
if($ldapconn) { 
    // binding to ldap server 
    $ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,dc=ubuntuldap2", "admin") 
or die ("Please enter valid login credentials. <a 
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back </a>"); 
    // verify binding 
    if ($ldapbind) { 
        echo "<center>"; 
      echo "<h2>Enter the Details</h2>"; 
  echo "<form action=replace_action.php method=post>"; 
  echo "<table border=1>"; 
  echo "<tr><td>ObjectClass</td><td><select 
name=objectclass><option value=user>User</option><option 
value=document>Document</option></select></td></tr>"; 
  echo "<tr><td>Replacing Object</td><td><select 
name=replaceobj><option value=givenname>givenName</option><option 
value=description>Description(If Document, paste 
link)</option></select></td></tr>"; 
  echo "<tr><td>Replace With</td><td><input type=text 
name=replace></td></tr>"; 
  echo "<tr><td>DN</td><td><input type=text 
name=dn></td></tr>"; 
  echo "<tr><td colspan=2 align=center><input type=hidden 
name=ou value=".$_GET['ou']."></td></tr>"; 
  echo "<tr><td colspan=2 align=center><input type=hidden 
name=uid value=".$_GET['uid']."></td></tr>"; 
  echo "<tr><td colspan=2 align=center><input type=submit 
name=submit value=Insert></td></tr>"; 
  echo "</table>";   
  echo "</form>";  
      echo "</center>"; 
 }   
// all done? clean up 
ldap_close($ldapconn); 
} 
?> 
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Replace_action.php 
 
<?php 
set_time_limit(30); 
error_reporting(E_ALL); 
ini_set('error_reporting', E_ALL); 
ini_set('display_errors',1); 
 
// config 
$ldapserver = '192.168.1.124'; 
$ldaptree    = "dc=ubuntuldap2"; 
 
// connect  
$ldapconn = ldap_connect($ldapserver) or die("Could not connect to LDAP 
server."); 
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 3); 
ldap_set_option(NULL, LDAP_OPT_DEBUG_LEVEL, 7); 
ldap_set_option($ldapconn, LDAP_OPT_REFERRALS, 0); 
 
 
if($ldapconn) { 
    // binding to ldap server 
    $ldapbind = ldap_bind($ldapconn, "cn=admin,dc=ubuntuldap2", "admin") 
or die ("Please enter valid login credentials. <a 
href='javascript:history.back()'>Back </a>"); 
    // verify binding 
    if ($ldapbind) { 
        $oc = $_POST['objectclass']; 
  $uid = $_POST['uid']; 
  $dn = $_POST['dn']; 
  $oc = $_POST['objectclass']; 
  $replaceobj = $_POST['replaceobj']; 
  $replace = $_POST['replace']; 
  $attr["$replaceobj"] = $replace; 
   $result = ldap_mod_replace($ldapconn,$dn, $attr); 
   if (TRUE === $result) { 
    echo "Entry was replaced."; 
    } 
    else { 
     echo "Entry cannot be replaced."; 
    } 
 }   
// all done? clean up 
ldap_close($ldapconn); 
} 
?> 
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